This paper studies the impact that capital market imperfections have on the natural selection of the most e cient rms by estimating the e ect of the pre-deregulation level of leverage on the survival of trucking rms after the Carter deregulation. Highly leveraged carriers are less likely to survive the deregulation shock, even after controlling for various measures of e ciency. This e ect is stronger in the imperfectly competitive segment o f t h e motor carrier industry. High debt seems to a ect survival by curtailing investments and reducing the price per-ton-mile that a carrier can a ord to charge after deregulation.
Most economic theories are either implicitly or explicitly based on an evolutionary argument: competition and exit assure that only the most e cient rms survive. This argument implicitly relies on the existence of perfect capital markets. In the presence of capital market imperfections, e cient r m s m a y b e f o r c e d t o e x i t d u e t o t h e l a c k of funds. Although this argument i s w ell understood in theory (Telser (1966) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) ), its empirical relevance is much less clear.
The crucial issue in trying to assess the e ects of nancing choices on the survival of rms and, thus, on the product market competition is the endogeneity of capital structure choices to the industry structure. If leverage a ects rm's competitive position, then rm's nancing decisions will take this into account. As a result, in the absence of a structural model we cannot determine whether it is the product market competition that a ects capital structure choices or a rm's capital structure that a ects its competitive position and its survival.
This paper attempts to address the endogeneity problem by looking at the e ects of leverage on the survival of trucking rms after the Carter deregulation. Deregulation was an exogenous shock, which unexpectedly changed both the competitive e n vironment in which rms operated and the leverage of rms, driving the e ective l e v erage far away from the desired one. By decreasing the value of rms' operating certi cates, a sort of monopoly license, deregulation sharply increased leverage above the desired level. Also, because deregulation increased the risk in the industry and made predation possible, it is likely that the target leverage decreased at the same time the rms' real leverage increased dramatically.
I study the survival of trucking companies during the eight y ears following the beginning of deregulation as a function of their economic e ciency ( tness) and their nancial resources (fatness). I nd evidence that more e cient rms are more likely to survive after deregulation, but I also nd evidence that their leverage at the beginning of the deregulation period has an impact on the probability of survival 8 years later. Therefore, not only the \ ttest" but also the \fattest" rms survive.
This result might appear obvious. It is well known that rms in a weak nancial position are more likely to go bankrupt this may be true independent o f a n y e ects of nancing on the rm's competitive position. To address this issue, I try to control for the ex-ante risk of default by using Altman's (1973) Z-score method. Even after controlling for the ex ante probability of default, leverage has still negative and statistically signi cant impact on survival. I also show that this e ect is not present in the early years after deregulation, but is concentrated in the 1980 to 1985 period, when the industry shake-out was more dramatic. Interestingly, this e ect is not homogeneous across di erent segments of the industry. It is most pronounced in the segment that remains imperfectly competitive e v en after deregulation, and it is zero in the segment that becomes fully competitive. I also try to probe deeper into the reasons why d e b t m a y jeopardize survival. In particular, I l o o k a t t h e i n vestments undertaken by motor carriers after deregulation and their pricing policy as a function of their initial level of leverage. I nd that the initial level of leverage has a negative impact on the ability of a motor carrier to invest in the years following deregulation. The e ect is particularly pronounced in those companies that are eventually forced to exit, suggesting that the underinvestment problem caused by the high debt level might h a ve forced these rms out of the market.
I also nd evidence that the pre-deregulation level of leverage negatively impacts the price per-ton-mile that a carrier charges during the price war which followed deregulation. This e ect is entirely concentrated in the less competitive segment of the industry.
This paper is part of a growing literature on the interaction between capital structure and product market competition. Besides a very early article by Spence (1985) , the pioneer works in this area are Phillips (1995) and Chevalier (1995a and 1995b) . They study the e ects of leverage on price competition and exit in industries that experienced a large number of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Both nd signi cant e ects of the LBOs on the competitive environment, under the form of increased prices and increased exit. Similarly, K o venock a n d Phillips (1997) use plant-level data to analyze the impact of a company's leverage on its plant closing decisions in industries where at least one of the major players undertook an LBO. They nd that debt a ects plant c l o s i n g a n d i n vestment decisions only in highly concentrated industries.
The interpretation of all these results, however, is made controversial by the fact that the decision to undertake an LBO is not necessarily exogenous with respect to the competitive environment in which a prospective LBO rm operates. If the managers of LBO rms anticipated the ultimate outcome of their actions, it would be impossible to distinguish whether these outcomes are the desired e ects that LBOs tried to achieve in the rst place or their unwanted side e ects.
A step forward in addressing the endogeneity problem is represented by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) . They look at supermarkets' pro t margins during recessions in regional markets di erentially a ected by LBOs. To the extent that some major recessions (like t h e Texas oil shock) are unexpected or very unlikely ex ante and that these recessions change the very nature of the competitive e n vironment, it is possible to interpret the results in a causal sense. A related paper studying the e ects of liquidity constraint on survival by using an exogenous shock is also Holtz-Eakin, Jou aian, and Rosen (1994) . They study the impact of inheritance on the probability of survival of small entrepreneurial rms.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides some background information on the characteristics of the trucking industry before and after deregulation. Section II describes the competing hypotheses on the e ects of nancial variables on the survival of rms and explains why the natural experiment represented by the trucking deregulation helps identify these e ects. Section III introduces the reader to the new dataset used in this paper. Section IV presents the results on the determinants of survival. Section V discusses the possible sources of this e ect. Finally, Section VI concludes.
I The Trucking Industry
Interstate motor carriers were brought under federal regulation by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, designed \to protect the public interest by maintaining an orderly and reliable transportation system, by minimizing duplications of services, and by reducing nancial instability." The act exempted the trucking industry from the antitrust law and required all interstate motor carriers to le their rates with the Interstate Commerce Commissions (ICC), which h a d the authority to set minimum rates and suspend rate cuts. Similarly, the ICC had the power to regulate entry into the industry through the concession of operating certi cates. The ICC followed a policy of not granting authority to serve a route already served so long as the existing carriers provided adequate service.
As a result of this regulation, rates were above marginal costs, as shown by the fact that the operating certi cates were priced at 15-20 percent of carrier annual revenue (Breen (1977) ). Besides the holders of the operating certi cates, the other big bene ciaries of regulation were the unionized employees (International Brotherhood of Teamsters), who, according to Moore (1978) , earned 30 percent more than similar workers in unregulated carriers.
The deregulation process began as a change in policy at the ICC level and was sanctioned by the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. The appointment of Daniel O' Neal as a chairman of the ICC in 1977 was instrumental to this change. A detailed chronology of the events and their impacts on the stock prices of publicly traded carriers is contained in Rose (1985) and Schipper, Thompson, and Weil (1987) . In sum, between 1978 and 1979 the ICC reversed its policy towards entry, accepting well over 90 percent of new service applications and beginning to liberalize rate settings. The e ect was a substantial drop in the stock m a r k et value of trucking companies and a reduction in the premium of unionized workers in the trucking industry (Rose (1987) ).
The deregulation e ects on the entire industry were devastating. Carriers started to compete on price. As the president o f a T eamsters local viewed it, \the rate cutting is horrible. The shippers are pitting one trucking company against the other. I heard that one cut the rate 47 percent." 1 As a result of this new intense price competition, between 1980 and 1985 a total of 4,589 trucking companies across the nation shut down, compared to 1,050 that closed between 1975 and 1980 (a ve-fold increase) . 2 At the same time the industry experienced a huge wave o f n e w e n tries. The number of carriers at the end of 1983 was about 40 percent higher than the number that existed when the Motor Carrier Act went i n to e ect. 3 In many c a s e s unionized trucking companies were closing to leave room for new, nonunionized companies. There is no question, then, that the regulatory reform of the late 1970s changed the competitive e n vironment of the trucking industry (see also Winston (1993) ). However, there might be some question about how expected this event w as when it took place. Had this event been perfectly anticipated, its e ects would have already been re ected in the nancing policy of trucking rms. Rose (1985) mentions that some initial steps for industry reform were taken by the ICC as early as 1975, with the main activity taking place in the 1978-1979 period. In a subsequent paper, Rose (1987) adopts the convention of dating deregulation from 1979. From an analysis of the S&P Industry Outlook of those years, I conclude that it is probably safe to take 1977 as the watershed. In that year, the industry report stated: \the industry will continue to be faced with the threat of regulatory reform. . . . However, given the strong opposition of the Teamsters' union, the successful lobbying campaign by the industry, and the opposition of the ICC, the materialization of any serious threat over the near term remains unlikely." The large decline in stock prices during the 1978 to 1980 period (see Rose (1985) and Schipper, Thompson and Weil (1987) ) con rms that deregulation was largely unanticipated, and that deregulation hit the industry during that period.
In studying the trucking industry, it is important t o k eep in mind its division into two fairly di erent segments: the truckload (TL), with shipments of 10,000 pounds or more, and the less-than-truckload (LTL), with shipments less than 10,000 pounds. The TL segment i s characterized by easy-to-nance capital investment and facility of market entry (in the absence of regulation). The LTL segment requires large capital investments to create hubs and generate a network able to distribute loads across di erent trucks, minimizing empty b a c khaul mileage. 4 The competitive pressure was experienced di erently in the two s e g m e n ts. According to Moore (1986) , rates in the TL sector fell 25 percent from 1977 to 1982. During the same period the LTL rates fell only 12 percent. The source of competition was also di erent. The TL segment su ered from both the entry of new carriers and the expansion of private carriers (businesses that haul their own products). By contrast, the LTL segment became quickly crowded with existing carriers that expanded in the LTL marke t a s a w ay to refocus their operating strategy in the face of entry by non-unionized carriers in the TL market.
II The Competing Hypotheses

A The Theoretical Predictions
This paper addresses two related questions. First, how d o e s l e v erage a ect a rm's ability t o respond to unexpected changes in the competitive e n vironment? Second, what are the sources of these e ects? In this section, I brie y summarize what theory has to say about these two questions and how m y \natural experiment" helps test these predictions.
If a rm's nancial structure is irrelevant, then I should nd no e ects of the initial leverage on a rm's ability to survive, provided I can properly control for a rm's e ciency level. Otherwise, there are three main reasons why the pre-deregulation level of leverage may negatively impact a motor carrier's survival during deregulation.
First, the initial level of debt may negatively a ect survival because highly indebted rms may be unable to nance large new investments (Myers (1977) ). This debt overhang might force leveraged rms to pass up pro table growth opportunities and, in the most extreme cases, even force them out of the market. As Myers (1977) points out, this problem is more likely to arise when investments cannot be collateralized easily. Therefore, debt overhang should not in general be a very serious problem for TL trucking companies, which h a ve easy-to-collateralize assets. LTL carriers, however, might su er more, because a larger fraction of their assets is intangible.
Second, the initial level of debt may negatively a ect survival because it directly a ects a rm's ability to compete. For example, in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , shallow-pocket rms are prone to predation by deep-pocket competitors. This predation may force highly leveraged rms to lose their market share or even exit the industry. This e ect should be present only in less competitive industries, because only in the presence of some barriers to entry can the predator recover the short-run costs of preying in the long run. Alternatively, a high level of leverage may a ect a rm's competitiveness because customers avoid dealing with a company that is likely to go bankrupt (Titman (1984) ), or because the leverage a ects a rm's incentive to maintain its reputation for producing a high quality product (Maksimovic and Titman (1991) ). All of these e ects should be unimportant for TL carriers, which provide a standardized service, but they may be relevant f o r L TL companies.
Finally, the initial level of debt may negatively a ect survival, because it forces ine cient rms to liquidate (Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990) ). Note that, unlike the two previous examples, here a negative correlation between survival and leverage is not evidence of a cost, but of a bene t of debt. The costs of liquidating a TL versus an LTL carrier are likely to be very di erent. Most of TL carriers' assets are represented by trucks, which c a n be liquidated at no signi cant cost. By contrast, part of the value of an LTL carrier comes from its terminal network and its sales organization, which are more costly to liquidate. As a result, it is plausible that the reduction in pro tability produced by deregulation makes it optimal to liquidate more TL carriers than LTL ones. It follows, then, that debt should have a stronger negative impact on survival of TL carriers, rather than LTL ones.
On the other hand, there are two main reasons why the pre-deregulation level of leverage may positively impact a motor carrier's survival during deregulation.
First, debt might force rms into restructuring sooner (Jensen (1989) ), maximizing their chances of survival. This might be particularly true in the trucking industry, where one of the biggest problems of existing rms was to convince unionized workers to accept wage cuts. For example, Perotti and Spier (1993) have modeled the bene ts of debt in extracting wage concessions from unions. If this is the case, then highly indebted carriers should be able to address their wage bargaining problems sooner and more e ectively and, by so doing, should be more likely to survive. Since the TL market is more likely to be nonunion and pay competitive w ages (through purchased transportation agreements), this e ect is likely to be more pronounced in the LTL sector.
Second, a highly leveraged rm may compete more aggressively because of the option-like payo of leveraged equity (Brander and Lewis (1986) ). If ex-post an aggressive expansion turned out to be the winning strategy, then I should nd that more highly leveraged rms are more likely to survive in the post deregulation period. This argument should apply mainly to the LTL segment of the industry because of its less competitive structure.
B The Nature of the Experiment
As it is well known, any attempt to investigate the e ects of nancial variables on real variables is a ected by t wo econometrics problems. First, capital structure choices are endogenous and, in the absence of an accepted structural model, we cannot determine whether, for instance, it is the product market competition that a ects capital structure choices or rather the rms' capital structure that a ects their competitive position and, eventually, their survival. Second, an econometrician can only observe imperfect proxies of the rm's characteristics that determine its capital structure and its performance. As a result, a correlation between the initial nancial position and the probability of exit may arise even if there is no causal relationship between the two, simply because both a company's debt level and its survival are a ected by the same company's characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician.
The \natural experiment" provided by the trucking deregulation helps address the rst problem in several ways. First, motor carriers' deregulation brought a major and unexpected change in the competitive structure of the trucking industry. During the regulated period rms had been barred from price competition and isolated from new entry but beginning in 1979 they suddenly faced intense price competition and massive n e w e n try. This change in the competitive e n vironment is exogenous with respect to trucking rms' leverage and their performance. 5 Since this exogenous change in the competitive e n vironment w as largely unexpected, it is di cult to argue that the capital structure was optimally chosen beforehand to deal with it. As a result, I can try to separate the undesired e ects of debt from the desired ones by estimating the e ect of debt on exit after controlling for the expected defaults under the pre-existing conditions. Second, not only did deregulation change the product market environment, but it directly a ected rms' capital structure. In fact, a signi cant portion of a motor carrier's assets was represented by the value of the operating certi cates. In many cases, these were also used as a collateral for bank loans. I have estimated that in the 1977 to 1980 period the marketto-book value ratio of assets of publicly traded trucking rms dropped by 20 percent. This translates into a sudden and unwanted increase in the e ective l e v el of leverage. As a result, it is likely that motor carriers found themselves excessively leveraged. This is especially true if one considers the increased uncertainty that followed deregulation.
Third, the nature of the sample makes it very unlikely that companies could promptly adjust their capital structure to the deregulation shock. In fact, most of the rms in my sample are small privately held rms with little or no access to the public equity o r b o n d markets. This makes it harder for them to quickly readjust the leverage after a negative shock such as the loss of the operating rights value and the change in the competitive e n vironment.
The natural experiment of deregulation, though, does not resolve b y itself the second problem: the possibility of spurious correlation due to unobservable characteristics. I address this problem in three ways. First, I address it directly, b y using a wide variety of control variables that should help capture all rms' characteristics. Second, I look for evidence of the mechanism by which an excessive amount of debt forces exit. In particular, I focus on its e ect on investment and on pricing. Third, I divide the sample according to a carrrier's percentage of LTL revenues and estimate the impact of debt across di erent groups. Since the theories discussed above suggest that debt has di erent impact for high and low L TL carriers, in a linear probability model I can use this splitting as an instrumental variable. 6 In this way, m y estimate of the di erential e ect of debt on survival across groups is consistent e v en if there are unobservable rm characteristics correlated with leverage.
III The Data
As a consequence of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, each regulated motor carrier holding interstate operating authority is required to le a calendar year report. In this report, trucking companies have to disclose not only nancial variables but also operating statistics, like t h e number of shipments made, the total number of ton-miles hauled, etc. The level of disclosure depends on the size of the carriers. Before 1980, carriers with gross revenue above $500,000 (Class I and Class II) led comprehensive reports, including operating statistics, while carriers with gross annual revenues below $500,000 (Class III) had to le brief statements, if their revenues exceeded $100,000. In 1980, the minimum threshold for class II carriers was increased to $1,000,000 and Class III carriers were released from ling. The data used for this paper comes from the American Trucking Association, which has been collecting and reclassifying ICC lings since 1976.
To determine the survival after deregulation, I have to establish when the deregulation shock hit the industry, and when the transition to a more competitive industry can be considered to be accomplished. On the basis of the stock price evidence and of the industry report I identify three periods: the pre-1978 years can be considered a fully regulated period, 1978 to 1980 represents a transition period, and the post-1980 years represent the deregulation period. By reviewing the S&P Industry Outlooks for every year since 1977, I decided that the industry transition was complete by 1985. The 1982 to 1983 recession hit the trucking industry particularly hard, and caused enormous exits. However, by 1984 to 1985 pro ts and rates in the industry became more stable. This can be considered as the rst period in which the industry returned \back to normal." Thus, my dataset consists of all ICC lings collected by the ATA for the period 1976 to 1985. As a result of the higher threshold for disclosure and the reduction in Class I and Class II carriers following deregulation, the number of carriers in the dataset drops from 2,897 in 1976 to 1,922 in 1985.
The ICC divides carriers into 13 categories as a function of the goods hauled: from general freight to household goods, from package (courier) to bulk commodities, etc. These categories can be thought of as di erent market segments. Specialized commodity carriers, for example, use di erent trucks, which cannot be easily adapted to carry general freight. As Table I shows, general freight carriers are by far the largest group (41 percent of the carriers). They are required to disclose more detailed information than specialized carriers. For both these reasons, I restrict my analysis only to this segment of the market. This guarantees greater homogeneity within the sample used, and greater availability of data.
A De nition of Exit
For the purpose of this study it is important to understand how I measure exit. I consider that a rm exits when it disappears from the ATA dataset. Trucking rms keep reporting to the ICC even if they are acquired, as long as they are separately operated. Each one has its own identi cation number, so name changes should have no impact. As a result, rms disappear from the dataset if they are liquidated (both voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy) or if they are acquired and merged with the acquiring rm. Therefore, by using the disappearance from the ATA dataset as an indication of exit, I measure the survival of a trucking company a s a separate organization.
During the post-deregulation period exit took place not only through bankruptcy, but also through voluntary liquidation. ICC reports show that, during the 1979 to 1985 period, 1,328
Class I, II, and III interstate motor carriers ceased operations for \legal, personal, economic or labor reasons," not involving bankruptcy. 7 Although the di erent w ays in which rms exit from a market is also an interesting subject, the objective of this paper is to test whether the most e cient organizations survived, regardless of the way they were nanced. The measure I obtained seems appropriate for this scope.
Firms exit from my dataset also because they fall below the minimum level of revenues that mandates disclosure (500,000 up to 1979, one million afterward). Although a signi cant drop in revenues can be regarded as an indication of failure in the marketplace, I do not want to consider as exited the rms that have a temporary drop in sales. For this reason, I classify a carrier as exited in year t only if it is not present in the dataset in that year and does not appear in any subsequent y ear, up to and including 1985.
Furthermore, to reduce this problem and to try to eliminate the bias induced by the change in disclosure requirements during the sample period, I restrict my analysis to companies having at least one million in revenues in 1977. Note that, given the high level of in ation in those years, a carrier with one million in revenues in 1977 will easily qualify as a class II carrier in 1980 even with a signi cant d r o p i n r e a l r e v enues. 8
B Summary Statistics
Table II presents summary statistics for Class I and II general freight carriers with more than one million in revenues in 1977. In that year there were 941 rms satisfying these criteria.
A particularly detailed level of disclosure is requested of the so-called Instruction 27 carriers. These are carriers that derive o n a verage 75 percent or more of their revenues from the intercity transportation of general commodities (approximately 60 percent of general freight carriers). Information for total ton-miles hauled, number of shipments made and percentage of shipments of more or less than 10,000 pounds tends to be present only for these carriers. Therefore, whenever I use this information, I lose 20 to 30 percent of the observations.
As pre-deregulation level of all the variables I use the average of the 1976 and 1977 values. The extremely high return on assets (ROA), equal to 18 percent, can be viewed as a sign of the rents enjoyed by t r u c king companies during the regulation era. Similarly, return on sales (ROS) is 8 percent. Another e ect of regulation is the high value of intangibles as a fraction of assets (6 percent). Operating certi cates bought from other carriers are included under this category. This is only a rough estimate of the true value of operating certi cates, because only the certi cates recently acquired (through a direct purchase or a merger) are valued fully.
Leverage measured as total debt divided by total debt plus book equity is 40 percent (median 35 percent). By subtracting cash reserves from the total debt, the mean leverage becomes 22 percent (median 20 percent). It is di cult to judge whether these are high or low levels of leverage, because very little is known about the capital structure of privately held companies (as most of these are). What makes the comparison even harder is that rms are required to le with the ICC on a nonconsolidated basis. As a benchmark, I collected data for the 66 trucking rms present in Compustat in 1977 (SIC codes 4210 to 4213). For these rms the ratio of debt to capital is 44 percent, not very di erent from the ICC sample.
The book value of leverage probably overestimates the actual leverage before deregulation, because the book value of equity does not include the market value of monopoly pro ts (except for the recently traded operating certi cates). A more appropriate measure of actual leverage before deregulation is provided by the level of coverage (earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation over interest expenses). 9 A median coverage of 9.8 gives a sense of the rather healthy nancial conditions of the trucking industry before deregulation. The book leverage, however, is probably a good estimate of the market leverage after deregulation, when operating certi cate became worthless.
During the 
C T h e T L v ersus LTL Distinction
In the following analysis, an important role is played by the distinction between TL carriers and LTL carriers. Ideally, w e w ould like to compare \pure" TL carriers with \pure" LTL carriers. As the summary statistics indicate, however, there is no such clear-cut distinction. In 1977, most carriers hauled both truck loads and less-than-truck loads, and on average 58 percent of general-freight carrier revenues came from LTL shipments.
To try to disentangle the di erential e ects of leverage in these two di erent segments of the market, I create three groups: carriers with less than 30 percent of their revenues in LTL, carriers with between 30 percent and 70 percent i n L TL, and carriers with more than 70 percent i n L TL. In 1977, among those carriers that reported information about their revenues per class of weight, there are 113 carriers in the rst group, 266 in the second, and 270 in the third. The attrition rate is identical in the two extreme groups (59 percent), it is slightly higher in the middle one (67 percent).
D Ex Ante Di erences Between Survivors and Non-Survivors
Before turning to a multivariate analysis, it is interesting to analyze the ex ante di erences in nancial and operating characteristics of carriers as a function of their fate in 1985. This is done in the sixth and seventh columns of Table II .
Survivors tend to be larger rms, with higher pro tability and lower leverage. In particular, the 1977 return on sales of future survivors is 4 percentage points higher, while ROA i s 7 percentage points higher. This result suggests that deregulation did, on average, select more e cient rms. This nding is con rmed by cost per mile (9 cents per ton-mile lower for survivors), although this di erence is not statistically signi cant a t c o n ventional levels. Quite surprisingly, survivo r s t e n d t o h a ve l o wer revenues (3 cents) per ton-mile. This might b e an e ect of the fact that carriers who used to enjoy large monopoly rents are less likely to survive. The same e ect is observed in the fraction of intangibles: survivors have o n a verage 1 percent f e w er assets represented by i n tangibles. If the value of operating certi cates re ected in intangibles is an indication of the degree of monopoly enjoyed by a certain carrier in its routes, this fact suggests that survivors are rms that enjoyed lower monopoly rents during the regulation era. It is remarkable how m uch l o wer was the 1977 level of levarage of rms who survived. The median ratio of debt over debt plus equity for survivors is 0.30, while for non survivors is 0.41. The di erence is similar when I subtract cash reserves: 0.13 versus 0.27. 10 Motor carriers can di er substantially in their cost structure. While some carriers rely mostly on employees for their shipments, others contract out a signi cant a m o u n t of transportation services. Contracting out transportation services was often used to prevent t h e unionization of the workforce.
The proportion of wage and bene ts over total operating expenses captures these di erences in cost and degree of unionization, because transportation services contracted out are recorded as purchased transportation and, thus, reduces the fraction of reported labor cost over operating expenses. Interestingly, survivors have a signi cantly smaller percentage of their operating costs accounted for by w ages.
By contrast, there is no statistically signi cant di erence between the average haul and the average load of survivors versus non survivors. Similarly, the percentage of LTL revenue is not signi cantly di erent for survivors.
IV The E ect of Leverage on Survival
The rst question I want to answer empirically is whether initial leverage has any e ect on the rm's probability of surviving, beyond what e ciency considerations would suggest. In a perfect capital market world the survival and the growth of a rm should be entirely determined by its e ciency characteristics. Therefore, the null hypothesis is
where X i is a measure of rm i's e ciency. Unfortunately, X 1985 i is not observable for the rms that exited. Even if it was, I would not necessarily want to use it because the observed level of e ciency might be a ected by the preexisting level of leverage. However, I can use some ex ante e ciency measures as a proxy for a motor carrier level of expected e ciency in the absence of any real impact of nancial variables. In other words, I use X 1977 i as a proxy for X 1985 i . This substitution corresponds to the assumption that the pre-deregulation level of eciency is linked to the post deregulation one. As long as surviving companies are concerned, this assumption is supported by the data (for instance the level of ROS in 1985 is statistically and economically signi cantly related to the level of ROS in 1977). Nevertheless, one potential concern is that the preexisting level of leverage is correlated to some unobservable characteristics that determine future e ciency. In what follows, I present a series of proxies designed to address this concern.
In sum, the basic regression relates a rm's status in 1985 to nancial and operating variables in 1977, or Pr fsurvival in
where Lev i is a measure of nancial leverage. Table III presents the results of estimating equation (2) through a probit model. For ease of interpretation, I report the coe cients as the derivative of the probability of survival with respect to the corresponding right hand side variable computed at the mean of the dependent variable. This represents the marginal impact of a change in the explanatory variable.
In the basic speci cation { besides leverage { the explanatory variables are: return on sales, a company's size (logarithm of the level of the average sales in 1976 and 1977), the level of intangibles (as a fraction of total assets), the proportion of wages over total costs, and nine regional dummies.
Return on sales is chosen as a main measure of e ciency for two reasons. It is directly related to the operating ratio (operating expenses over operating revenues), which is the leading e ciency index used in the trucking industry. Second, it is less sensitive than return on assets to misvaluation of assets or to the extent to which some transportation is done with \for hire" trucks.
A measure of size is inserted for various reasons. Size might be a proxy for e ciency, because only e cient rms become big. 11 Larger rms may also have more bargaining power on the product market and/or have easier access to nancing. Finally, size may matter for spurious reasons, because small rms are more likely to fall below the threshold that requires them to le with the ICC. All these explanations predict a positive impact of size on the chances of survival.
I insert the level of intangible assets as a proxy for the extent to which a carrier enjoyed monopoly rents before deregulation. This is admittedly a poor proxy, because only recently acquired operating certi cates appear in the balance sheet. 12 It is important, though, to attempt to control for monopoly rents before deregulation because the measure of e ciency used (return on sales) is distorted by the presence of monopoly rents. For a given level of pro tability, a higher degree of monopoly indicates that a rm is less e cient. The level of intangibles, then, is expected to have a negative e ect on survival.
A high proportion of wage and bene ts over total operating expenses re ects a limited role of purchased transportation and/or a more expensive labor force. Since both these phenomena are generally associated with unionization, a high proportion of wage and bene ts can also be interpreted as a proxy for unionization. All these factors are likely to have a negative impact on a rm's ability to survive in a deregulated environment.
Finally, regional dummies are inserted to control for possible heterogeneity across di erent areas. Carriers are attributed to one of the nine geographical groups established by the ICC on the basis of a carrier's main location.
As expected, more pro table rms are more likely to survive, and so are larger rms. By contrast, rms with a higher proportion of labor cost over total cost are less likely to survive. All these e ects are statistically signi cant at the 5 percent level or less. Even after controlling for these variables the initial level of debt seems to jeopardize a rm's chances of survival. The e ect is statistically signi cant at the 1 percent l e v el and is also economically relevant, although not huge. A one-standard deviation increase in leverage reduces the probability of survival by 8 percent.
An alternative w ay to measure the economic importance of this e ect is by answering the following question: how m uch more e cient (i.e. pro table) must a company be to o set the negative impact on survival produced by an increase in leverage from 0.2 (the average) to 0.3? By using the probit estimates, I obtain that a trucking company needs to have a return on sales 0.7 percentage points higher (i.e., 10 percent higher with respect to the median ROS of 7 percent) in order to o set 10 percent more capital nanced by debt. The e ect, thus, is small but not trivial.
The impact of leverage remains unchanged when I use return on assets (ROA) rather than return on sales as a measure of a rm's e ciency (see column II). Similarly, results are not substantially changed if other measures of leverage are used. For example, speci cation III uses coverage instead of net debt to capital, with similar results.
A Alternative Measures of E ciency
Using return on sales (or on assets) as a measure of e ciency can pose some problems. First, given that in 1977 the trucking industry was regulated, a high return on sales may just indicate the presence of large monopoly rents, not a high degree of e ciency. Second, high return on sales is also associated with a greater availability o f c a s h o w from operations, and ROS may also capture this additional e ect.
In order to test the robustness of my ndings, I try some alternative measures of e ciency. The rst is an estimate of the distance of each motor carrier from the production possibility frontier. This is a measure of technical ine ciency, which does not rely on any assumption on the market in which a rm operates. As described in the Appendix, I estimate this by following the technique suggested by S c hmidt and Sickels (1984) .
The results are reported in the rst column of Table IV . The degree of ine ciency has a positive (and not negative) e ect on the probability of survival, and this e ect is borderline statistically signi cant. 13 However, it is interesting to notice that the impact of leverage on the probability of survival remains unchanged after introducing this additional measure of e ciency.
Another measure of e ciency is the cost of operations. For the carriers that disclose the number of ton-miles hauled, I can obtain a measure of the cost per ton-mile. This measure has the advantage of being independent of the market structure in which a carrier operates. Regardless of the size of monopoly rents, a trucking company should always minimize costs. This measure has the drawback that it improperly accounts for a rm's cost of capital. In fact, operating expenses include depreciation (accounting, not economic, depreciation) and do not include the opportunity cost of capital. Another disadvantage is the fact that cost per ton-miles does not control for di erences in the tra c mix (i.e., di erent a verage hauls and di erent a verage length of hauls).
The second column of Table IV reports the results of the previous probit model, when cost per ton-mile is inserted as an additional measure of e ciency. Notice that, because of data limitation, the number of observations available drops by 25 percent with respect to Table III. Higher cost carriers are not at all less likely to survive after deregulation than low cost carriers. Again, the impact of leverage is still present and statistically signi cant.
Finally, a last attempt to control for the expected e ciency of motor carriers after deregulation is done in column III, by using the return on sales in 1980. I use 1980 because it is a watershed year. While the major changes in the trucking industry took place in the 1980 to 1985 period, the ICC deregulation started in 1978. Therefore, the 1980 ROS should at least partially capture the after deregulation e ciency level, while leaving enough observations of exit.
Column III in Table IV shows that the results are not substantially changed when I disregard 1978 to 1980 exits and insert the 1980 ROS as an additional explanatory variable. This suggests that 1977 leverage is not simply a proxy for an unobserved e ciency factor. 14 B Controlling for the Ex Ante Risk of Default It is possible that the most highly leveraged rms in 1977 were also the most ine cient and, thus, the most likely to exit the industry independent o f a n y negative e ect of debt. In the event that my measures of e ciency do not fully capture a rm's quality, the observed e ect of leverage may simply be a spurious one.
To address this problem I try to control for the ex ante probability of default. I do that by using Altman's Z-score method. Altman (1968) is the rst to develop a discriminant analysis method to forecast the probability of a rm's default using accounting information. One of the many applications of Altman's method is to the railroad industry, Altman (1973) . Given the similarities of the regulatory environment and of the accounting disclosure between the railroad and trucking industry, I c hoose to use the estimates of the Z-score model derived in this context. 15 Each rm is assigned a score according to the following formula in Altman (1973) where X 1 is cash ow o ver xed charges, X 2 is transportation expenses over operating revenues, X 3 is earned surplus over total assets, X 4 is the 1-year growth rate in operating revenues 16 , X 5 is earnings after taxes over operating revenues, X 6 is operating expenses over operating revenues, and X 7 is income before interest and taxes over total assets. The higher the Z-score, the lower the probability of default is. Table V , column I, reports the estimates of the basic regression after having inserted a carrier Z-score as a proxy for the ex-ante probability of exit. As expected, companies with a higher Z-score are more likely to survive. Nevertheless, the initial leverage has still a negative and statistically signi cant impact on the chances of survival, and its magnitude is substantially unchanged.
I can also use the Z-score to separate the desired e ect of debt on exit from the undesired one. Suppose that the pre-deregulation level of leverage was chosen to induce the optimal liquidation policy of motor carriers in the pre-deregulation environment. Then, the pre-deregulation Z-score should capture the desired e ect of debt on exit and any residual e ect can be interpreted as the undesired e ect. Therefore, I want to estimate the e ect of debt conditioned on the fact that the Z-score method predicted survival.
To transform the Z-score into a prediction on a rm's default I need to choose a cut-o point. If I use Altman's cut-o point, I obtain very few defaults and the results are substantially identical to the one reported in Table III . Therefore, I choose the cut-o point so that the number of predicted defaults corresponds to the number of actual exits from my sample. Note that by doing so I bias the results against nding any e ect of debt. In fact, ex ante people did not expect such a large exit from the trucking industry. Table V , column II, reports the estimates of the basic regression restricted to the rms that the Z-score method predicts would survive. The initial level of leverage still has a negative im-pact on survival, and this impact is statistically signi cant at the 1 percent level. Pro tability and size have coe cients similar to the basic estimates and are both statistically signi cant at the 1 percent level. This negative e ect of debt can be interpreted as the undesired e ect of debt on survival.
For completeness, I also report the estimates conditioned on the Z-score model predicting a default (Table V, column III) . Again leverage has a negative impact on the probability o f survival, statistically signi cant at the 5 percent. All the other variables have the same sign, and all except the ratio of intangible assets are signi cant at the 10 percent l e v el or better.
C Comparison of Leverage and Its E ects in the TL and LTL Segment Table VI , panels A, B, and C report summary statistics for carriers in the di erent segments of the market. LTL carriers tend to be larger, in terms both of sales and of assets, and to be less highly levered. Interestingly, there is no di erence in the initial level of debt between survivors and non survivors among TL carriers, while this di erence is large and statistically signi cant for carriers with at least 30 percent o f r e v enues in LTL and for carriers with more than 70 percent of revenu e s i n L TL (see last two columns of Table VI) .
This di erential impact of leverage, however, does not control for the di erent c haracteristics of the carriers in the three segments. This is done in Table VII , which reports the estimates of equation (2) for the three segments. Interestingly, the initial level of debt has no impact on the probability of survival of motor carriers with less than 30 percent of their revenues in LTL. The point estimate is actually positive (0.02), albeit not statistically signi cant. By contrast, the initial level of debt has a strong and statistically signi cant negative e ect on survival in the other two groups, more heavily involved in LTL. In particular, the impact of debt on survival of the carriers most concentrated in LTL is statistically di erent (at the 10 percent l e v el) from the impact of debt on survival of the carriers least concentrated in LTL.
In an unreported regression, I also estimate the e ect of debt on survival across the three groups using a linear probability model. As discussed in section II.B, in a linear framework the estimated di erence in the impact of debt in the high LTL carriers and in the low L TL carriers is a consistent estimate of the true di erence. The estimated di erence is -0.26, which is statistically di erent from zero at the 10 percent l e v el. Thus, consistent with the theories predicting a negative e ect of debt, this e ect is larger (in absolute value) for predominantly LTL carriers. This nding also supports the view that the impact of debt on survival is not simply an e ect of unobserved quality di erences.
It is important to notice that these results arise in spite of the fact that the percentage of exits in the two extreme groups is the same. This fact makes the assumption that these results are driven by an unobserved rm characteristic that a ects both leverage and exit implausible.
V Why Does Debt A ect Survival?
The ndings thus far suggest that the initial level of debt might h a ve some consequences on the ability of a motor carrier to survive during deregulation. In this section, I try to uncover the sources of this observed relationship.
A Investment
If highly leveraged motor carriers are weeded out because they cannot successfully nance new investment, then I should be able to nd some e ects of initial leverage on the amount o f investment undertaken by each rm during the post-deregulation period.
Since the ATA data set does not contain ow of funds data, I measure the total amount of capital expenditures in the post-deregulation period as the di erence in gross operating property o ver the period 1977 to 1985 divided by the 1977 level of net operating property. I then estimate a reduced form equation in which i n vestments are a function of a company's pro tability, its size, the level of intangibles, and the proportion of labor cost. Table VIII reports the OLS estimates of this equation. After controlling for the likely determinants of investments, the initial level of leverage seems to have no impact on the amount o f i n vestment actually made during the post-deregulation period.
One caveat, however, is warranted. If debt a ects a rm's investment policy, the negative e ciency consequences of this underinvestment are likely to jeopardize a rm's ability t o survive. Since we can observe the investment o ver a certain period only for the rms that survived until the end of the period, by estimating the investment o ver the entire post deregu-lation period I may miss the most important e ect. To o vercome this problem, I estimate the same investment equation considering only the investments that took place up to 1980. By that time the deregulation shock on leverage has already occurred, but the large exodus from the industry has not.
The results are reported in the second column of Table VIII . In this case we do observe a negative e ect of leverage on investment. One standard deviation increase in the initial level of leverage decreases the total investment in the three years following deregulation by 1 0 p e r c e n t, and this e ect is statistically signi cant a t t h e 5 p e r c e n t level.
If the proposed explanation is indeed the source of these ambivalent results, then I should nd that the e ect of debt on investments is mostly concentrated among rms that eventually exit the industry. The last two columns of Table VIII show that this is indeed the case. The investment policy of rms that eventually survive i s n o t v ery much a ected by debt. By contrast, this e ect is very strong (both economically and statistically) among rms that exit the industry.
Why is the e ect of debt mostly limited to rms that eventually exited? One possible explanation is that the market had di erent perceptions of the long term viability of highly leveraged carriers. Some were perceived as viable, obtained nancing, inve s t e d a s m uch a s t h e low l e v eraged carriers, and survived. Others, which w ere not perceived as viable, were forced to curtail their investments and eventually left the industry. This explanation is consistent with Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) , who nd that debt reduces the growth of rms with a low T obin's q, but not of rms with a high Tobin's q. In fact, if one interprets survival ex-post as a proxy for the ex-ante Tobin's q (which I cannot observe because the rms are privately-held), my results are analogous to Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) . While this interpretation is consistent with some unobserved heterogeneity, it does not necessarily imply that non surviving carriers were of inferior quality. As Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) point o u t , i t m i g h t just be that they were perceived by the market as such.
Another (related) possibility, which does not rely on the surviving carriers being of a higher quality, is that highly leveraged rms di er in the resources available to their owners. Some rms may b e o wned by deep pockets investors, ready to support the necessary nancing. These highly leveraged carriers, then, invest as the low l e v eraged ones and survive. By contrast, highly leveraged carriers without a deep-pocket investor cannot keep-up the investment l e v el and, as a result, are forced to exit eventually.
In sum, the evidence suggests that the rms that exited the industry have su ered from an underinvestment problem linked to their initial level of debt. Yet, I cannot rule out the possibility that this e ect is caused by unobserved heterogeneity in carriers' quality.
B Pricing
Leverage may a ect survival also by w eakening a rm's competitive position. As reviewed in section II, several models suggest that a high leverage may force rms into cutting their prices. These models, however, di er substantially in the nature of their predictions. Bolton and Scharfstein's (1990) model of predation makes predictions on the equilibrium price prevailing in a certain market as a function of the incentive o f d e e p p o c ket rms to prey their shallow pocket competitors. By contrast, Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1990) do not make a n y prediction on the market equilibrium price but only on the price di erential between a rm and its competitors.
B.1 Price data
General freight carriers are required to disclose the amount of ton-miles transported in a calendar year. By dividing a carrier's operating revenues by the number of ton-miles reported, I can thus obtain a proxy of the actual price per ton-mile charged by e a c h carrier. This measure is noisy because the price changes not only as a function of the segment of the market a carrier is in (TL versus LTL), but also as a function of the average haul of a carrier, since there is a xed cost for loading and unloading each shipment. However, if the composition of shipments of each individual carrier is fairly stable over time (a non trivial assumption during deregulation), I can eliminate some of the noise by considering the changes in the prices charged by the same carriers over a certain period. Therefore, I will use these estimated price changes over di erent time interval to analyze the e ects of the initial level of leverage on a carrier's pricing policy.
B.2 Estimates of the impact of leverage on prices
To test the predation hypothesis I would need to identify many separate markets. Unfortunately, I lack a clear way to do that. If I use the nine geographical regions identi ed by t h e ICC, I will have too few observations to estimate a cross-market regression. Using the state boundaries would give me more observations, but it is highly unsatisfactory from an economic point of view. There is no reason why the e ective market in which a carrier competes is limited to the state in which its headquarter is located. To m a k e things worse, the results would be very sensitive to the way a market is de ned (and, thus, who the main competitors in this market are). Thus, I cannot test the predation hypothesis with the available data.
By contrast, I am better positioned to test the e ect of leverage on the prices of individual carriers. While it would certainly be better to be able to control for factors that a ect prices at a local-market level, the lack of a precise de nition of market only weakens the power of the test.
For this reason, I try to explain changes in the prices charged by individual carriers as a function of some real variables and the initial level of leverage. The control variables are: rst, state dummies, which absorb any regional e ect second, the proportion of labor cost over total cost at the beginning of the period, as a proxy of the cost structure of each carrier and, indirectly of its degree of unionization third, the size of the carriers vis-a-vis its state competitors in 1977 (which I improperly refer to as market share), fourth, the percentage of revenues obtained through LTL shipments. Table IX reports OLS estimates obtained from regressing the changes in the price charged by each carrier on these controlling variables and the initial leverage. I estimate separate equations for every year from 1980 to 1985. The rate setting was liberalized in 1980, so this year marks the beginning of price competition. On the other hand, 1985 can be considered the year when the post-deregulation industry equilibrium was reached. In between, 1982 represents the trough of a recession when, according to industry sources, price cuts were most aggressive.
Interestingly, in 1980 the price changes are una ected by the initial level of debt: the coe cient is actually positive, but is economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero. It is only starting with 1982, that the carriers that entered the deregulation period with more leverage start to charge signi cantly lower prices than their direct competitors. This e ect is both economically and statistically signi cant. One standard deviation increase in the initial level of leverage decreases a carrier's prices by 7 c e n ts per ton-mile. This represents approximately a 22 percent discount with respect to the average price per ton-mile. This e ect persists in 1983 and 1984, while it is economically weaker and not statistically signi cant i n 1985.
These results seem to support the idea that more highly leveraged rms are forced to discount their products, especially during recessions. It is less clear, though, what the ultimate reason for this discount is. It might be the fact that highly leveraged carriers are desperate for cash, or that consumers require a compensation for the risk of dealing with a company that might go bankrupt (Titman (1984) ). While the rst e ect should hold indi erently across TL and LTL carriers, the second one is more likely to be important i n L TL carriers which deliver a non-standardized product, where service is more important. It is worth noting that at the time there was much discussion in the press about the potential cost a LTL shipper might incur if its carrier defaulted in the middle of an important shipment.
For this reason, I explore the di erences in the impact of debt across industry segments. To present these results in a concise form, I pool the price changes over the six-year period and estimate a separate coe cient of the initial level of debt for every year (the results are substantially identical if I estimate six separate regressions). Year dummies (not reported) are also inserted. Table X reports the results. Interestingly, the initial level of debt has no e ect in the price changes of \pure" TL carriers. By contrast, the e ect is very pronounced for the \pure" LTL carriers. It starts to manifest itself in 1981 and is particularly pronounced in 1982 and 1983. This nding is consistent with the hypothesis that leveraged carriers discount their services to compensate consumers for the risk associated with the probability of default of the carrier.
These results seem to contrast with Phillips (1995) and Chevalier (1995b) , who nd a positive relation between the increase in leverage caused by LBOs and increases in prices. The contrast, however, is more apparent than real. In fact, the industries studied by Phillips (gypsum, polyethylene, berglass insulation, and tractor trailer) and Chevalier (supermarkets) do not involve m uch speci c investment b y the customers. Thus, the need to discount the good in order to compensate the customers from the risk of bankruptcy, which is present for LTL carriers, is not likely to arise for their rms.
Moreover, neither paper nds that prices always increase. Phillips (1995) nds that, in one of the four industries he analyzes, prices drop after the LBOs. Similarly, Chevalier (1995b) nds that, in some local markets, supermarket prices drop after the LBO wave. In both cases, the authors point out that this phenomenon occurs in markets where there are some competitors with deep pockets. This is certainly the case in the trucking industry, if I consider that carriers are competing throughout the nation. In sum, the relation between prices and leverage seems to be very dependent upon the nature of the good and the nancial position of competitors.
VI Conclusions
This paper studies the impact of capital market imperfections on the survival of rms. In general, the feasibility o f s u c h a study is seriously impaired by an endogeneity problem. It is impossible to determine whether rms perform poorly and exit because they are highly leveraged, or vice versa, that they are highly leveraged because they perform poorly and should be induced to leave. The deregulation in the trucking industry provides a unique natural experiment which m a y o vercome this problem.
I study the e ect of the pre-deregulation level of leverage on the subsequent survival of trucking rms during deregulation. I nd that rms that happened to be highly leveraged at the beginning of deregulation are less likely to survive afterward, even when controlling for some measures of e ciency and for the ex-ante probability of default. I nd that the initial level of leverage has a negative impact on the ability of a motor carrier to invest in the years following deregulation. The e ect is particularly pronounced in the companies that are eventually forced to exit, suggesting that the underinvestment problem caused by the high debt level might h a ve forced these rms out of the market.
I also nd evidence that the pre-deregulation level of leverage negatively impacts the price that a carrier charged during the price war which f o l l o wed deregulation. This e ect is entirely concentrated in the LTL segment of the industry.
In general, my ndings raise the possibility that sometimes natural selection leads to the survival of relatively ine cient rms, which happens (or choose) to have deep pockets. In industries with high barriers to entry (like L TL shipments) relatively ine cient rms that survive are not likely to be challenged by new entrants. Thus, in these industries, these selection \mistakes" may h a ve long-lasting e ects. In other words, my ndings challenge the commonly-held assumption that competition will necessarily lead to the survival of the ttest. Only future research w i l l b e a b l e t o a n s w er how generalizable these ndings are. (3) where lnY it is the logarithm of rm i's output at time t, X z are the K factors used in the production process, and F l are L controlling factors to account for possible heterogeneity o f the principal input categories.
In this context, the rm's speci c factor i is the algebraic sum of a common intercept and a rm speci c level of ine ciency u i :
The output Y is the number of ton-miles transported by carrier i in year t. The factors used are capital (net carrier operating properties), labor (number of workers) and intermediate goods (de ated expenses in fuel and supplies). As controlling factor I used the size of the average haul and the average load, plus two y early dummies. The within estimates of equation (3) are present e d i n T able 17. The estimates look reasonable. The estimated elasticity of output with respect to capital is 0.09, with respect to labor 0.20, and the elasticity with respect to fuel and supplies is 0.32. The within regression can explain 60 percent of the variability. Schmidt and Sickles's (1984) intuition is that the estimated rm-speci c e ect^ i can be used to obtain an estimate of the production ine ciency of rm i ( u i ). This is obtained aŝ u i = maxf^ i g ;^ i :
I estimate theû i by using regression (3) and then use the estimated value as a measure of ine ciency in regression (2). The New York Times, December 13, 1983.
4
As Glaskowsky (1986) points out, while the TL segment of the industry is fairly close to the textbook de nition of a competitive m a r k et, with no signi cant economies of scale, very low barriers to entry and many atomistic players, \the LTL carrier segment i s not atomistic in any sense of the word. A small and still shrinking group of increasingly large rms dominates this tra c nationally. LTL operations do have signi cant economies of scale. The established large national LTL carriers are bene ciaries of an almost insurmountable nancial barrier to entry: their large and widespread terminal networks." The emphasis is in the original text.
5
One could claim that regulatory actions are not independent of the economic performance. Although this argument is generally valid, it does not seem to t well the trucking deregulation. For instance, Rothenberg (1987) , as cited in Rose (1987) argues that motor carrier deregulation was largely independent o f i n terest lobbying activity. In fact, both the American Trucking Association and the Teamsters Union aggressively opposed deregulation. 6 Assume that, after partialing out the observable measures of qualities, the true relationship between survival and leverage is given by y = x +z + , where x is leverage and z is an unobservable measure of quality. The concern is that cov(z x) 6 = 0 so that^ is inconsistent. In particular, I am concerned that cov(z x) < 0, i.e., worse quality rms are more highly leveraged. This is the case in a pecking order theory a l a M y ers (1984) , where rms become highly leveraged because they are unpro table. In this case, however, cov(z x) will be the same across di erent market segments. I can, then, divide the sample in high LTL carriers and high TL carriers. In a linear probability model the estimate of the impact of leverage on survival in the two groups is given bŷ If the impact of quality on survival is similar between the two groups (i.e., TL = LTL ), then the di erence between the two estimated coe cients is a consistent estimate of the true di erence between the two coe cients. Cited in Glaskowsky (1986) .
8
The results are not sensitive to the level of this cuto . In fact, the pre 1980 exits appear to be uncorrelated with leverage.
9
Whenever EBITDA is negative I p u t t h e v alue of coverage to zero. If coverage exceeds 100 or the interest expenses are zero I arti cially equate coverage to 100.
10
One might w onder whether these di erences in leverage simply re ect di erences in the investment opportunities across rms (see for example Smith and Watts (1992) ). However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that the negative relation between investment opportunities (measured as Tobin's q) and leverage appears to be mainly driven by equity issuers. Since almost all the rms in this sample are privately held (and thus cannot issue equity at wish), this negative correlation is not like l y t o b e a major source of concern.
11
This argument, although standard, is necessarily appropriate to this case because the industry was regulated until 1977, and thus the size of a rm may be in uenced more by regulation than by e ciency.
12
These intangibles might also appear in the balance sheet in case of a merger, if the acquiring company used the purchased method of accounting. In such case, the potential impact of intangibles is ambiguous.
13
In their original article Schmidt and Sickels (1984) apply their technique to the airline industry and nd that there is no link between estimated ine ciency and survival of airline carriers.
14 It also implies that the 1977 level of leverage has some predictive p o wer on the probability o f a rm's survival between three and eight y ears after. This rejects the hypothesis that the impact of leverage on survival is simply driven by rms on the verge of bankruptcy in 1977.
15
A preferable alternative w ould be to estimate the Z-score model with trucking data. Unfortunately, the ATA dataset starts in 1976, making it impossible to estimate the Z-score model for trucking rms in the pre-deregulation period 16 Altman (1973) uses a three year growth rate, but I use the one year growth because I have just one year of accounting data for the pre-1977 period.
17
The estimator of a rm's ine ciency is consistent for T (number of periods) going to in nity. Therefore, I decide to include 1978 as a pre-deregulation year to increase the precision of the estimates. I also try to estimate a model using data up to 1980 without signi cant c hanges in the results. Advance payables include any notes payable. Negative b o o k v alues of equity are set equal to zero. Coverage is set equal to zero when earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA) is less than or equal to zero and equal to 100 when coverage is greater or equal to 100. Observations with a return on assets larger than 1 or smaller than -1 are set equal to missing. The di erence column reports the di erence in means between carriers that were still alive in 1985 and carriers that were not alive at that date. The p-values refer to the null hypothesis that the di erence between the two means is equal to zero. Table III E ect of Initial Leverage on the Probability of Survival
The dependent v ariable is the probability that a general freight motor carrier with more than one million in revenues in 1977 survives until 1985. The reported coe cients are probit estimates of the e ect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of survival, computed at the average of the dependent v ariable. All the independent v ariables are measured as of 1977 (average of the 1976 and 1977 values) . Net debt-to-capital is total debt minus cash reserves divided by total debt plus equity. I n tangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Labor cost is the ratio of the wages and bene ts to operating costs. Among the independent v ariables there are also nine regional dummies (not reported indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. Table IV Robustness to Di erent Measures of E ciency
The dependent v ariable is the probability that a general freight motor carrier with more than one million in revenues in 1977 survives until 1985. The reported coe cients are probit estimates of the e ect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability o f survival, computed at the average of the dependent v ariable. Net debt-to-capital is total debt minus cash reserves divided by total debt plus equity. I n tangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Labor cost is the ratio of the wages and bene ts to operating costs. All the independent v ariables are measured as of 1977 (average of the 1976 and 1977 values) except that the 1980 return on sales in the last column. Column I uses the estimated ine ciency of a carrier as additional proxy for a carrier's e ciency. This is computed as the distance of its output from the production frontier, estimated using a translog function (see Appendix). Column II uses as additional proxy for e ciency the cost per ton-mile. Cost per ton-mile is the ratio of operating expenses to ton-miles hauled. Column III uses the ex-post value of e ciency as of 1980 as a proxy for e ciency. In such case the dependent v ariable is the probability o f survival after 1980. All regressions contain nine regional dummies (not reported Pseudo-R 2 0.14 0.14 0.14 N 575 731 670
indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. The dependent v ariable is the probability that a general freight motor carrier with more than one million in revenues in 1977 survives until 1985. The reported coe cients are probit estimates of the e ect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability o f survival, computed at the average of the dependent v ariable. Net debt-to-capital is total debt minus cash reserves divided by total debt plus equity. I n tangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Labor cost is the ratio of the wages and bene ts to operating costs. The rst column reports the results of the basic regression of the probability of survival when the Altman Z-score is used as an additional explanatory variable. Altman Z-score is an index, based on accounting information, of the risk of default. The higher the Z-score, the lower the probability of default is. The second regression reports results of the basic regression of the probability of survival conditioned on the fact the Z-score model predicted survival. The third regression reports the results of the basic regression of the probability of survival conditioned on the fact the Z-score model predicted default. All regressions contain nine regional dummies (not reported indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. Table VI Summary Statistics Split According to the Industry Segment General freight carriers with more than one million in operating revenues in 1977 are divided in three groups according to the fraction of their revenues coming from less-thantruckload shipments as of 1977. Net debt-to-capital is total debt minus cash reserves divided by total debt plus equity. I n tangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Labor cost is the ratio of the wages and bene ts to operating costs. Revenues per ton-mile is is the ratio of operating revenues to ton-miles hauled. Average load is the ratio of ton-miles hauled to total miles traveled. Average haul is the ratio of ton-miles hauled to tons of revenues freight. Market share is the ratio between a carriers' operating revenues and the sum of the operating revenues of all the carriers located in the same state. The di erence column reports the di erence in means between carriers that still existed in 1985 and carriers that did not exist at that date. The p-values refer to the null that the di erence is equal to zero. The dependent v ariable is the probability that a general freight motor carrier with more than one million in revenues in 1977 survives until 1985. The reported coe cients are probit estimates of the e ect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability o f survival, computed at the average of the dependent v ariable. Net debt-to-capital is total debt minus cash reserves divided by total debt plus equity. I n tangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Labor cost is the ratio of the wages and bene ts to operating costs. All the independent v ariables are measured as of 1977 (average of the 1976 and 1977 values) . Among the independent v ariables there are also nine regional dummies (not reported). General freight carriers are divided into three groups according to the fraction of their revenues coming from less-than-truckload shipments as of 1977. The rst column reports the estimates for motor carriers with less than 30 percent o f r e v enues from less than truckload shipments (LTL). The estimates in the second column regards motor carriers with more than 30 percent but less than 70 percent of their revenues in LTL shipments. The estimates in the third column regards motor carriers with more than 70 percent of their revenues in LTL shipments. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. Table VIII   Investments This table reports the OLS estimates obtained by regressing capital investments of general freight motor carriers with more than one million in revenues in 1977 on some pre-determined explanatory variables. Investments are computed as di erences in carriers' gross operating properties over the period divided by the 1977 level of net operating properties. Net debt-tocapital is total debt minus cash reserves divided by total debt plus equity. I n tangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Labor cost is the ratio of the wages and bene ts to operating costs. All the independent v ariables are measured as of 1977 (average of the 1976 and 1977 values) . Column I considers the investment o ver the period -1985 , column II over the period 1977 -1980 . Column III considers the investment o ver the period 1977-1980, but restricts the sample to the motor carriers that survived until 1985, while column IV restricts it to motor carriers that exited between 1980 and 1985. All the regressions also contain nine regional dummies (not reported). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Investment Independent 1977 -1985 -1980 -1980 -1980 indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. This table reports OLS coe cient estimates for a sample of general freight motor carriers with more than one million in revenues in 1977 that disclose data on the volume of their shipments (Instruction 27 carriers). The dependent v ariable is the vector of the di erences between the price per ton-mile charged by a carrier in any y ear between 1980 and 1985 and the price charged in 1977. Net debt-to-capital in 1977 is debt minus cash reserves divided by debt plus equity. Labor cost in 1977 equals wages plus bene ts over operating costs. A carrier market share in 1977 is the ratio between a carriers' operating revenues and the sum of the operating revenues of all the carriers located in the same state. The rst column reports the estimates for motor carriers with less than 30 percent o f r e v enues from less than truckload shipments (LTL). The estimates in the second column regard motor carriers with more than 30 percent but less than 70 percent of their revenues in LTL shipments. The estimates in the third column regard motor carriers with more than 70 percent of their revenues in LTL shipments. All the regressions contain state xed e ects and yearly dummies (not reported indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. [1976] [1977] [1978] . The dependent v ariable is the logarithm of ton-miles hauled each y ear. Capital is the book value of net carrier operating properties. Labor is the numberofworkers employed. Intermediate goods are de ated expenses in fuel and supplies. As a factor controlling for possible heterogeneity of the principal input categories, the average haul and the average load, plus two y early dummies are used. The average load is the ratio of ton-miles hauled to total miles traveled. The average haul is the ratio of ton-miles hauled to tons of revenues freight. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 0.60 N 1683 indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less indicates the coe cient i s s i g n i c a n tly di erent from zero at the 5% level indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level.
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